Fighting Against XSS Attacks: A Usability Evaluation of OWASP ESAPI
  Output Encoding by Wijayarathna, Chamila & Arachchilage, Nalin Asanka Gamagedara
 Fighting Against XSS Attacks: 
A Usability Evaluation of OWASP ESAPI Output Encoding 
 
Chamila Wijayarathna 
University of New South Wales 
Australia 
c.diwelwattagamage@student.unsw.edu.au 
Nalin A. G. Arachchilage 
University of New South Wales 
Australia 
 nalin.asanka@adfa.edu.au 
 
 
Abstract 
Cross Site Scripting (XSS) is one of the most 
critical vulnerabilities exist in web applications. XSS 
can be prevented by encoding  untrusted  data  that 
are loaded into browser content of web applications. 
Security Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) 
such as OWASP ESAPI provide output encoding 
functionalities for programmers to use to protect their 
applications from XSS attacks. However, XSS still 
being ranked as one of the most critical vulnerabilities 
in web applications suggests that  programmers  are 
not effectively using those APIs to encode untrusted 
data. Therefore, we conducted an experimental study 
with 10 programmers where they attempted  to  fix 
XSS vulnerabilities of a web application using the 
output encoding functionality of OWASP ESAPI. Results 
revealed 3 types of mistakes that programmers made 
which resulted in them failing to fix the application by 
removing XSS vulnerabilities. We also identified 16 
usability issues of OWASP ESAPI. We identified that 
some of these usability issues as the reason for mistakes 
that programmers made. Based on these results, we 
provided suggestions on how the usability of output 
encoding APIs should be improved to give a better 
experience to programmers. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
2017 OWASP Top 10 report [1] listed Cross Site 
Scripting (XSS) as one of the 10 most critical security 
risks for web applications1. XSS has been ranked 
among the top 10 most critical security risks for web 
applications since the start of OWASP Top 10 project 
in 2010. According to OWASP Top 10 2017 report [1], 
XSS is the 2nd most prevalent security issue and it exists 
in 2/3 of web applications. 
XSS is a security vulnerability that allows attackers 
to inject client-side malicious scripts into web pages 
 
 
1OWASP - Open Web Application Security Project (https:// 
owasp.org/) 
of applications. Those scripts will thereafter execute 
in victims’ web browsers when they access those web 
pages [2]. Successful XSS attacks can result in serious 
security violations for both the web site and the user. 
An attacker can inject a malicious code into user input 
of a web application, and if the input is not validated, 
the code can steal cookies and login credentials [3, 4, 
5], transfer private information [4, 5], hijack a user’s 
account [3, 4, 5], manipulate the web content [4, 5], 
cause denial of service [6] and many other malicious 
activities [2, 7]. 
A recent XSS vulnerability identified in eBay 
allowed attackers to include malicious JavaScripts 
into auction description field of a selling item [3]. 
When a genuine user visits a listing with a such 
malicious auction description, the attached JavaScript 
will automatically execute. Some attackers have 
reportedly include scripts that transfer login details of 
users, so when a user visits the affected listing, the 
script will be executed and it will transfer user’s login 
details/cookies to the attacker [3]. 
Programmers can prevent their web applications 
from being vulnerable to XSS attacks by separating 
untrusted data from active browser content [1]. One of 
the techniques for achieving this is encoding untrusted 
output data when loading them into browser content 
[1, 8]. However, most programmers who are involved 
in application development are not security experts and 
they are  not capable  of  implementing  such security 
techniques on their own [9]. Therefore, security experts 
have developed these functionalities so that non-expert 
programmers can use these functionalities when 
developing applications via Application Programming 
Interfaces (APIs). There are several APIs that 
implement output encoding functionalities that 
programmers can use to protect their applications 
from being vulnerable to XSS attacks. OWASP 
Enterprise   Security   API   (ESAPI)2,   OWASP   Java 
 
 
 
2https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category: 
OWASP_Enterprise_Security_API 
Encorder3   and  Microsoft  Anti-Cross  Site  Scripting 
Library4 are a few such security APIs. 
However, 2/3 of applications still being vulnerable 
to XSS attacks [1] implies that programmers have 
failed to effectively use functionalities exposed by 
these APIs  to  prevent  their  applications  from  being 
vulnerable to XSS attacks. One possible reason for 
this can be the lack of usability of APIs that provide 
output encoding functionalities. When APIs that 
provide output encoding are not usable, programmers 
will fail to correctly use them in their code and 
therefore, will fail to protect applications they develop 
from being vulnerable to XSS attacks. Previous 
research has shown that less usable APIs, especially 
those that provide security functionalities, result in 
programmers incorrectly using them and introduces 
security vulnerabilities to applications they develop [10, 
11, 12]. 
In this study, we tried to evaluate the usability of 
one of the most commonly used APIs that provide 
output encoding functionalities, OWASP ESAPI, and 
attempted to identify how usability issues of OWASP 
ESAPI would fail programmers who want to fix XSS 
vulnerabilities in their applications. To achieve this 
objective, we conducted a qualitative experimental study 
with 10 programmers. In the experiment, programmers 
used OWASP ESAPI to fix XSS vulnerabilities in a web 
application. The study employed think-aloud method 
[13] and cognitive dimensions questionnaire method 
[14] to identify usability issues they encounter while 
performing this task. 
From the data we gathered, we identified 16 usability 
issues of OWASP ESAPI. We also found 3 types of 
mistakes that programmers made while completing the 
task that caused them to fail in successfully fixing the 
XSS vulnerability. We identified that some of the 
identified usability issues are a main reason for mistakes 
that programmers made. Based on this, we provided 
suggestions to improve the usability of security APIs 
that provide output encoding functionalities. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews 
previous related research. Section 3 describes the 
experiment methodology and section 4 presents the 
findings of the study. In section 5, we discuss the 
findings and provide suggestions to improve usability of 
output encoding APIs. Finally, we conclude the paper 
with discussion of limitations and conclusion. 
 
 
 
3https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_ 
Encoder_Project 
4https://www.microsoft.com/en-au/download/ 
details.aspx?id=43126 
2. Related Work 
 
The relationship between the usability of security 
APIs (APIs that provide security related functionalities) 
and security of end user applications that use those 
security APIs has become a topic of high interest among 
researchers recently [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. There 
have been several studies that discuss and investigate 
this relationship [9, 15, 16, 19, 20]. 
By pointing that programmers are not security 
experts, Wurster and van Oorschot argue that improving 
usability of tools and APIs that programers use is 
important to minimize mistakes they make while 
developing applications [9]. Acar et al. [20] also 
highlight the importance of the usability of security 
APIs by pointing that programmers who make use of 
security APIs are not experts of security. Mindermann 
[19] argues that security of an application will be far 
better if the libraries and APIs used to develop that 
application are more usable. He stresses the importance 
of applying usability research for security APIs to 
deliver more usable security APIs. 
Even though the importance of the usability of 
security APIs has been identified and discussed [9, 15, 
16, 19], not much work has been done to evaluate the 
usability of security APIs. Gorski and Iacono [17] 
presented 11 characteristics that need to be considered 
when evaluating the usability of security APIs. Green 
and Smith [18] introduced 10 rules for developing 
usable  security  APIs.  By  considering  these  2  sets 
of guidelines and by referring to previous work done 
on usability evaluation of general APIs, Wijayarathna, 
Arachchilage and Slay [14] presented a cognitive 
dimensions framework, which consists of 15 dimensions 
to be used in the usability evaluation of security APIs. 
There are few studies that involve empirical 
evaluations  of  security  APIs  [15,  21].   Acar  et 
al. [15] evaluated and compared usability of 5 
cryptographic APIs for python. They identified that 
security of applications that use security APIs is 
significantly related to the usability of security APIs 
used for developing  the  application.  Wijayarathna 
and Arachchilage [21] used think-aloud approach and 
cognitive dimensions questionnaire method to identify 
usability issues of Bouncycastle API, an API that 
provides cryptographic functionalities. 
There is a huge body of research done on the field 
of XSS attacks [7, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29]. 
Previous research has proposed and discussed various 
methods for XSS attack implementation [22, 23], XSS 
attack detection [24, 25], XSS attack prevention [26, 27] 
and XSS vulnerability detection [28, 29]. Various 
methods have been proposed to prevent XSS attacks 
by developing applications that are not vulnerable to 
XSS attacks [7, 26, 27]. However, the most commonly 
practiced method for XSS prevention is the output 
encoding of untrusted data [8]. Even though so many 
areas related to XSS have been investigated, as per 
authors knowledge, there have been no investigation on 
the usability of output encoding APIs and how usability 
issues of output encoding APIs result in applications 
being vulnerable to XSS attacks. Our work attempts 
to fill this gap by studying programmers who use 
OWASP ESAPI to secure web applications from XSS 
vulnerabilities. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
The study was designed to identify usability issues 
of OWASP ESAPI that programmers encounter while 
they are using it to protect their applications from XSS 
vulnerabilities.   Furthermore, we intended to observe 
how usability issues affect programmers and security of 
applications they develop. This study was approved by 
the Human Research Ethic Committee of our university. 
Conducting a user study is a widely known method 
for identifying usability issues of APIs [14, 15, 21]. 
In a user study based usability evaluation, evaluators 
will recruit programmers and ask them to complete 
some tasks that will require them to use the  API 
under evaluation. Then, evaluators will identify 
usability issues by observing programmers while they 
are completing the task and from the feedback they give 
upon the completion of the task. 
We employed two techniques to identify usability 
issues that programmers encounter while using the API, 
which are popular in the API usability community. 
Those are: 
 
• Cognitive dimensions questionnaire based 
method [14, 21, 30] 
 
• Think-aloud method [13, 21] 
 
Cognitive dimensions questionnaire based method 
[14, 30, 21] is the only methodology that has been 
proposed to specifically use in evaluating the usability 
of security APIs [14]. The cognitive dimensions 
framework presents a set of dimensions that describe 
aspects of a tool or an API that impact its usability 
[14, 31].  We used the version of cognitive dimensions 
framework proposed by Wijayarathna, Arachchilage 
and Slay [14] in this study, which consists of 15 
cognitive dimensions. This framework is embedded to 
the usability evaluation process through the cognitive 
dimensions questionnaire [14, 31]. In the evaluation 
process,  once  participant  programmers  complete  a 
programming task, they have to individually answer the 
questionnaire based on their experience [14, 31]. In this 
way, evaluators can evaluate each aspect of the API that 
is covered by the cognitive dimensions framework and 
identify usability issues of the API. 
We used think-aloud method [13] to get more 
insights into the issues that were identified by the 
cognitive dimensions questionnaire method and how 
those issues affected programmers. Using two different 
techniques helps to improve the reliability of data we 
collect [32]. Furthermore, we expected that it would 
help us to identify a broad range of usability issues of 
the API. 
 
3.1. Task Design 
 
First we had to design a programming task for 
participants to follow. 
We designed a programming task where 
participant programmers have to use output encoding 
functionalities provided by OWASP ESAPI to fix XSS 
vulnerabilities in a Java servelet web application. We 
developed a simple online forum type web application 
that allows users (end-users of the application) to create 
new forum posts by entering text data as input, stores 
that data in a back-end data store and shows the forum 
posts in the web interface when requested by end-users. 
Web pages that show forum posts loaded data  that 
were entered by end-users (hence untrusted) into web 
page content without performing any encoding, hence 
making the application vulnerable to stored XSS attacks 
[2]. Appendix A shows the source of a sample page 
in the application where untrusted data entered by 
users loaded into active HTML, HTML attribute and 
JavaScript contents. The provided application contained 
two web pages with XSS vulnerabilities in different 
type of elements (i.e. HTML, HTML attribute and 
JavaScript). We asked participants to locate places in 
the code with XSS vulnerabilities and fix them using 
output encoding functionalities provided by OWASP 
ESAPI. 
 
3.2. Pilot Study 
 
Before conducting the main study, we requested 3 
participants, who are known to the first author and 
not related to the study, to complete the task by 
following the guidelines to verify whether guidelines 
are clear and convey  the  expected  meaning.  They 
also answered the cognitive dimensions questionnaire 
proposed by Wijayarathna, Arachchilage and Slay [14] 
after completing the task. We did minor modifications to 
task guidelines and the questionnaire (change wording 
so participants can better understand task guidelines and 
questions) based on their results.   Modified versions 
were used in the main study. 
 
3.3. Participants 
 
We recruited programmers with Java experience 
from GitHub to participate in the study. We used Github 
to recruit participants rather than recruiting participants 
from our university or local software development firms, 
to get a more diverse sample of programmers. This is 
a widely accepted and used method among researchers 
to recruit participants for developer studies [15, 16]. 
Furthermore, recruiting participants from Github helps 
to get participants with more experience in software 
development, which improves the ecological validity 
of the study [16]. We extracted publicly  available 
email addresses of Java developers with significant 
contributions to Java projects and sent emails inviting 
them to participate in our study. We offered them with 
a $15 Amazon gift voucher as a token of appreciation 
for the participation. In the invitation email, we 
included a link to sign up for the study. Furthermore, 
we informed them that participation is voluntary and 
participants can withdraw from the study at any time. 
Sign up form required participants to enter their name 
and email address, which were required to send study 
material to them. However, such personally identifiable 
information of the participants were removed from the 
final data set which we used for the analysis. 
We conducted 4 usability studies parallelly and 
recruited participants to all 4 studies together. We sent 
13000 invitations to Java developers and 347 developers 
signed up for the study by completing the sign  up 
form. Some emails we sent were bounced and some 
developers requested to be removed from our list, a 
request we honored. Furthermore, some people replied 
back to us saying that they are unable to participate 
in the study.  Once  people  signed  up,  we  filtered 
out those who did not have any software development 
experience since our target sample for the study was 
software developers. Furthermore, we filtered out 
participants with no experience in using Java because 
if a participant faces issues with programming language 
while completing the task, we may not be able to clearly 
identify usability issues of the API they had come up 
with. Then we divided participants who signed up into 
four studies we conducted based on their demographics. 
We selected 51 programmers for the ESAPI API study 
and sent study material for them. However, some of 
them informed that they are not able to complete the 
study and some of them dropped out without informing 
us. A total of 10 participants completed the study. Table 
1 summarizes demographics of the participants that took 
part in the study. 
 
Table 1.  Participant demographics summary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of Hours Spending for Java programming 
Currently Not using Java 2 20% 
1 to 10 hours per week 3 30% 
11 to 20 hours per week 3 30% 
  21 to 30 hours per week 2 20%   
Participant has previously used OWASP ESAPI or not  
Yes 2 20% 
No 8 80% 
 
 
 
 
3.4. Study Procedure 
 
Participants completed the task remotely on their 
own computers and we suggested them to complete 
the task in a time comfortable to them. We requested 
them to think-aloud [13] and record their screens with 
voice (so thinkaloud results will be recorded) while 
completing the task. Once participants completed the 
task, they were asked to send their source codes with 
video recordings to us via email. Participants spent 35 
minutes in average to complete the task. Then each 
participant had to complete the cognitive dimensions 
questionnaire [14, 21, 30], which we shared with them 
via Google forms. 
 
3.5. Identification of Usability Issues 
 
Once we finished the data collection, source codes 
of solutions that participants developed were evaluated 
to see whether they have fixed the XSS vulnerability 
correctly. Application had 3 types of contexts (HTML, 
HTML Attribute and JavaScript) where participants 
had to protect using 3 different  methods  of  the 
API (encodeForHTML(), encodeForHTMLAttribute(), 
encodeForJavaScript()). We separately evaluated 
whether participants had protected these elements of the 
web application successfully. 
Then analysis of video recordings and questionnaire 
responses were done manually by one analyst.   We 
Demographic Number Percent 
Software Development Experience 
Less than 1 year 
 
2 
 
20% 
1 to 3 years 6 60% 
5 to 10 years 1 10% 
more than 10 years 1 10% 
Java Experience 
1 to 2 years 
 
1 
 
10% 
2 to 3 years 4 40% 
3 to 5 years 2 20% 
more than 5 years 3 30% 
 
used manual analysis since our data set was  small 
[33]. Questionnaire answers were analysed prior to 
analysing videos and identified usability issues that 
exist in OWASP ESAPI. After analysing questionnaire 
answers, recordings were analysed to identify usability 
issues that each participant encountered. For identifying 
usability issues from the screen recording data, user 
experience was evaluated by tracking resources used, 
events where the participant showed surprise,  events 
where participant had to make difficult choices, context 
switches, misconceptions, difficulties faced, mistakes 
made, requested features and time taken for tasks. 
Cognitive Dimensions Framework [14] was used as a 
guidance in the analysis of both questionnaire responses 
and recordings. Usability issue reporting format 
introduced by Lavery et al. [34] was used to report 
issues. Finally, video recordings were analysed again 
to identify how usability issues that were identified, 
affected the participants for securely completing the 
task. Special attention was given to decisions made 
by participants that caused to reduce the security of 
programmes they developed. 
 
4. Study Results 
 
In this section, we are presenting results we obtained 
from this study. For the ease of presentation, we labeled 
participants with labels P1, P2,.., P10. They will be 
referred with this label from here onward. Statements 
made by participants that are presented in this section 
were not corrected for any grammatical errors and are 
presented as those were stated. 
4.1. Security of the Developed Programmes 
 
Table 2 shows the security of the programme each 
participant developed. Furthermore, it shows which 
components of the web application they successfully 
secured and which components they failed to secure. 
We observed 3 main types of errors that participants 
made that resulted in them failing to secure the 
application. Those mistakes are, 
1. Participants failed to identify all places in the 
source code that contained XSS vulnerability and 
hence fixed the code partially (P2, P7). 
2. Participants  used  wrong   encoding   method 
to    encode    data. For example, used 
encodeForHTML() to encode data inside 
JavaScript (P2, P6). 
3. Encoded input instead  of  output  using  one 
or two encoding methods. Mostly using 
encodeForHTML() (P3, P5, P8, P9, P10). 
Table 2.   Security of Each Participant’s Programme 
 
Participant 
ID 
Overall 
Security 
of the 
Aplication 
Correctly 
Encoded 
HTML 
Content 
Correctly 
Encoded 
HTML 
Attribute 
Content 
Correctly 
Encoded 
Javascript 
Content 
P1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
P2 ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ 
P3 ✗ Encoded input with encodeForHTML() 
P4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
P5 ✗ Encoded input with encodeForHTML() 
P6 ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ 
P7 ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ 
P8 ✗ Encoded input with encodeForHTML() 
P9 ✗ Encoded input with encodeForHTML() 
P10 ✗ Encoded input with encodeForHTML() 
 
 
4.2. Usability Issues of OWASP ESAPI 
 
From the study,  we  could  identify  a  total  of 
16 usability issues of OWASP ESAPI. Questionnaire 
responses revealed  a total  of 12 issues while video 
recording analysis revealed 12 issues. Each participant 
had encountered an average of approximately 7 usability 
issues. Here onward, we present each usability issue 
with the comments made by participants and what we 
observed. 
Participants P2, P5, P6, P8 and P9 mentioned that 
there is too much information to read and  learn  in 
order to use the API to complete  the  task  and  fix 
XSS vulnerabilities. They mentioned that this makes 
it difficult for them to get the minimum understanding 
about the API that was required to use the API to fix 
XSS vulnerabilities. Furthermore, they mentioned that it 
made it difficult for them to understand which part of the 
API to use in order to achieve the goal. P6 mentioned 
in his response to the questionnaire that “Even though 
the guidelines, the cheatsheet, was actually well written, 
the page itself was kinda  long-ish.”.  One  of  the 
main resource provided from OWASP about using 
OWASP ESAPI to fix XSS vulnerabilities is the “XSS 
Prevention Cheat sheet [8]” (At the time we conducted 
the experiment, this mainly referred to ESAPI. However, 
recently they have removed ESAPI specific code from 
this and made it a more generic one.5). Even though 
it provided all information required to use the API 
correctly to fix XSS vulnerabilities, most programmers 
did not follow it, saying it  was  too  long.  This 
made them refer to third party resources that provided 
partial solutions, which resulted in participants failing to 
successfully complete the task. This was elaborated by 
 
 
5https://web.archive.org/web/20170615122701/ 
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_(Cross_ 
Site_Scripting)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet 
P3 as well where they mentioned that “I did not even use 
the API documentation.There was a blog post with the 
required information, which was pretty much straight 
forward”. 
Results from all participants showed that it is 
difficult to use the API without previous knowledge on 
some computer security related areas. Results revealed 
that it was hard to use the API without a previous 
knowledge on attacks, XSS attacks, XSS mitigation 
techniques and input sanitization. We could identify 
that lack of security knowledge specially made it hard 
to test whether the security vulnerability has been 
fixed properly, which resulted in participants falsely 
concluding that they have successfully fixed the XSS 
vulnerability. Some participants mentioned that they 
are not capable of testing what they developed due to 
their lack of security knowledge. P5 mentioned that “It 
seems to me that output encoding untrusted data (which 
is done in one function call) sufficed, though I lack the 
knowledge to know if I’ve prevented all dangerous cases 
or not.”. Furthermore, P5 mentioned that API and its 
documentation did not provide details about XSS and it 
was difficult to find required information. 
P1, P2, P3 and P8 mentioned that it was difficult 
to figure out how to achieve output encoding using the 
API. Some of them noted that programmer needs to 
have a previous knowledge on what type of encoding 
is required for each type of element. We observed that 
these participants spent a notable amount of time for 
searching things such as “output encoding using OWASP 
ESAPI” in Google and browsing through the results. P2 
highlighted this in their response to the questionnaire 
saying “It was bit hard to grasp the idea of what output 
encoding and how we can achieve this with the API.”. 
P3, P5, P6, P7, P8 and P9 faced difficulties while 
completing the task due to issues in OWASP ESAPI 
documentation. Their results revealed that, 
 
• Documentation is too lengthy. 
• Documentation is not attractive for programmers. 
• Documentation is difficult to understand. 
• Some documentation is outdated. 
 
These issues resulted in programmers referring to 
unreliable third party resources such as code samples 
in Stack Overflow to learn the API. This was observed 
in P7’s recording and think-aloud results also where 
they mentioned that “I tried to search for some 
documentation, but, I found out answers from stack 
overflow. Its really not bad”. Furthermore, above 
issues made it difficult for programmers to use the API 
and made the learning period lengthier.  We observed 
that many participants spent a considerable time to 
learn the API by going through documentation and 
other resources. P7 explained their experience with the 
documentation saying “I expected some documentation 
online - but after a few minutes I found that there is no 
up to date documentation available and I’d have to stick 
to JavaDoc and reading the sources”. 
Another usability issue that participants encountered 
is the lack of examples. P2, P3, P6, P7 and P8 
reported in their questionnaire responses as well as in 
their think aloud results that API lacks examples and a 
proper ‘getting started’ guide. P8 mentioned that “In 
the document there are so many information but less 
usage examples. so it is hard to understand 1st time.”. 
Participants mentioned that lack of examples made it 
difficult for them to learn the API and also made it 
difficult to know what classes and methods of the API 
to use when writing code. Participants suggested that 
including examples into documentation will give a better 
experience to programmers. P6 suggested that “I would 
have liked a big h1 sign saying “Example usage” for the 
APIs. Since I wasn’t able to find examples as quick as I 
wished.”. 
While completing the task, P5 and  P10  found 
that Integrated Development Environment(IDE)’s 
suggestions are not working for the API. After entering 
method names, both these participants tried IDE 
suggestions to get an understanding about the required 
arguments for the method. Instead of providing useful 
suggestions, IDE showed parameter names such as 
arg0, arg1, etc. Participants mentioned that this made 
them spent more time for learning the API and it made 
it difficult to use the API. 
P4 and P7 mentioned in their responses to the 
questionnaire that viscosity of the code that use the 
API was poor as it was difficult to make changes to 
the code that use the API. They mentioned that API 
had to be embedded into many places in the code and 
if they later find something that need to be changed, 
it need to be applied for many places, which made 
changing the code difficult. P7 elaborated saying 
“There are too many places where ESAPI call is used 
- it’d be really hard if I’d be forced to alter the call 
ESAPI.encoder().whatever(value)”. 
P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P9 and P10’s results revealed 
that there were different methods that looked similar, but 
provided different functionalities and made it difficult 
for the participants to select correct methods to use 
in  their  code.  These  participants  found  it  difficult 
to identify the difference between  encodeForHtml() 
and encodeForHtmlAttribute() methods. This made it 
difficult for them to choose correct method to use, which 
sometimes resulted in them using a incorrect method 
and therefore, failed in fixing the vulnerability. P4 
described issues they faced in their response to the 
questionnaire when we questioned about the consistency 
dimension [14] of the API. They said that “There were 
kind of similar things. But if you are really familiar with 
html and other related technologies I think you can sort 
them after.For an example there are plenty of methods 
like encode content, encode attribute etc. Those may 
sound similar if you are not really familiar with html or 
any other related technologies.” 
Results of P3, P4, P5, P8, P9 and P10 revealed that 
API did not provide any help to identify incorrect usages 
of the API. Results showed that API did not provide 
any help to identify that participants were using the API 
incorrectly, when they used it to encode input instead 
of output. Furthermore, API did not provide any way 
to inform participants when they used different methods 
in wrong contexts (eg: when using encodeForHtml() to 
encode values of Javascript contents). P3 elaborated on 
this in their questionnaire response when we asked if 
the API gave any help to identify that they used the 
API incorrectly. They mentioned “no, I first used it 
to encode the input before saving, which was stupid”. 
However, P4 did not believe this as an issue of the API 
as they mentioned that “Usually API itself doesn’t give 
you clues of correct usages other than argument type 
mismatches.”. 
Results from all participants revealed that end-user 
protection of the application would depend on the 
programmer who used the API to fix the vulnerability. 
Participants had to make choices while using the API 
that will affect the security of the code they developed 
and this could lead participants to develop less secure 
code using the API. P7 elaborated in their questionnaire 
response on how the security of the code would depend 
on the programmer. They mentioned that “If I’d miss 
some place in JSP that prints out the user input, entire 
application would become vulnerable to XSS”. P5 
suggested how API could minimize the dependency of 
security from programmers saying “by providing a good 
level of abstraction and explanatory documentation, the 
API can help reduce the struggle of the programmer and 
minimize errors.”. 
Results from P1, P3, P5, P6, P7 and P9 revealed that 
API did not provide any help for them to test the security 
of the code they developed using the API. This resulted 
in participants finding it difficult to verify whether they 
developed the code securely using the API or not. We 
observed that most of the participants did not properly 
tested the security of the code they developed even 
though the task was about fixing a security vulnerability. 
Most of them tested whether the vulnerability that 
could be exposed from HTML content has been fixed. 
But none of them tested vulnerabilities that could be 
exposed from HTML attribute and JavaScript content. 
It seemed that most of them did not have a sufficient 
knowledge to test whether the vulnerability has been 
fixed. While completing the task, P5 mentioned in their 
think-aloud output that “I dont know if I finished the task. 
There might still be vulnerabilities in the application.”. 
Furthermore, P1 reported that it was difficult to evaluate 
the progress of a partially developed code that use the 
API, while completing the task. They elaborated saying 
“I had to go through every page and find out what are 
the untrusted content in each page”. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
From the results of the study, we identified 3 types 
of mistakes that participants made that resulted in them 
failing to fix the vulnerability. We also identified 16 
usability issues that were encountered by participants. 
We observed that some of these usability issues were a 
main reason for those mistakes that participants made. 
To protect the application successfully, API 
required participants to identify all the places that the 
vulnerability existed and use the API to fix all these 
locations. However, P2 and P7 failed to identify all the 
places that the vulnerability was present and therefore 
resulted in only partially fixing the vulnerability. This 
made the API less effective and hence, less usable [35]. 
Some web frameworks such as Ruby 3.0 and React 
JS automatically escape inputs [1] without depending 
on the programmer to identify existing vulnerabilities 
and  vulnerable  code  snippets.  Integrating  that  sort 
of functionality, or a functionality to protect web 
applications from a more higher level (protect at web 
page level rather than going into element level) would 
enhance the usability of the API and hence, would help 
programmers to more effectively use the API to develop 
applications that are not vulnerable to XSS attacks. 
Furthermore, we observed that P2 and P6 used 
wrong methods to encode data in some cases, which 
failed them in successfully completing the tasks. Some 
of the usability issues we identified aided participants 
in making this mistake. Lengthy documentation 
demotivated participants to properly read and grasp 
ideas in most cases. Therefore, most participants 
skimmed through documentation. When reading the 
“XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet” [8], most participants 
did not properly read it and hence, could not get a 
proper idea about different encoding methods required 
for different element types. However, P1 read “XSS 
Prevention Cheat Sheet” [8] completely before they 
started to fix the vulnerability. Their think-aloud results 
mentioned that they have previously used the API and 
hence, want to refresh their memory. It appeared in 
their think-aloud results that reading “XSS Prevention 
Cheat Sheet” [8] before starting to fix vulnerability was 
something they decided based on prior experience with 
the API. Other participants failed to identify that they 
need to read it and therefore, failed to get a proper 
idea about what encoding methods required for what 
elements. Furthermore, less attractiveness and lack of 
examples in official documentation made programmers 
referring to third party sources such as Stack Overflow. 
Those 3rd party sources mostly contained examples that 
use EncodeForHTML() method and did not highlight 
that different methods should be used to encode data, 
based on the type of element the data is used in. 
Therefore, participants used EncodeForHTML() method 
to encode data in HTML attribute and JavaScript 
elements that should have been encoded using different 
methods. Brief and attractive documentation with more 
examples would make it satisfactory and easy to follow 
those documentation and would help programmers to 
learn the correct way of using the API to protect their 
applications. It will also make the API less reliant on 
programmers’ previous knowledge on XSS attacks and 
XSS mitigation techniques, which would make the API 
easily usable for programmers, especially for those who 
are not experts of security. 
Furthermore, participants blamed API as it did not 
provide any indication when they incorrectly used the 
API. Participants expected the API to notify them when 
they use an incorrect method to save a data element. 
They also expected that API would notify them or 
prevent them when they used the API to encode input 
data instead of output data that it is really supposed 
to encode. Previous research has also suggested that 
security APIs should be hard to misuse and they should 
notify programmers on incorrect use [14, 18]. It would 
be ideal for the API to provide better mechanisms to 
prevent programmers from incorrectly using it. 
One of the main reasons for participants not been 
able to successfully fix the XSS vulnerability is that 
they did not properly tested whether the vulnerability 
has been fixed after they completed the task. It was 
apparent when observing think-aloud results and screen 
recordings of participants that most participants were 
not competent enough to test the security after applying 
the API and API did not helped them in this either. 
Some participants only tested with the sample malicious 
input we gave with task guidelines. Once an application 
worked fine with that input, they assumed that they 
have successfully fixed the vulnerability. Previous 
research has suggested that security APIs should help 
programmers to test the security of the applications that 
use the API [14, 17]. Therefore, OWASP ESAPI should 
either provide test routines and scripts for programmers 
to test their applications, or the API documentation 
should properly guide programmers on how to validate 
that they have properly used the API to remove XSS 
vulnerabilities in their applications. 
 
6. Limitations 
 
Since the main objective of our study was to identify 
usability issues of OWASP ESAPI, we used a pool of 
10 participants. It has been acknowledged that a user 
study would identify about 80% of usability issues of an 
user interface by employing 4-5 subjects (i.e. participant 
users) [36]. Virzi identified that additional subjects 
are less likely to reveal new information and the most 
severe usability problems are likely to be detected in 
first few subjects [36]. Furthermore,  more recently, 
Hwang and Salvendy [37] introduced “the 10±2 rule” 
where they argued that 10±2 users will be sufficient to 
conduct a usability evaluation. They also stated that 
small participant pools are adequate when using think 
aloud approach for usability evaluations. Even though 
this results are based on user studies conducted for 
user interfaces, our results suggest that this holds for 
API usability studies as well. We could identify 16 
usability issues of the ESAPI and we could explain the 
mistakes that participants made based on these issues. 
However, because of the small sample pool we used, 
we could not infer any statistically significant results 
such as correlation between demographic variables and 
outcomes. We are planning to extend this study and 
explore these aspects in a future study. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this study, we conducted a remote behavioural 
usability study with 10 software developers  to 
identify usability issues that exist in  OWASP 
ESAPI. Participants were asked to complete a simple 
programming task which required them to fix XSS 
vulnerabilities of a Java servelet web application. 
They had to think aloud and record their screens while 
completing the task and once they finished the task, 
they had to answer the cognitive dimensions based 
questionnaire [14]. Through the data we collected, 
we were able to identify usability issues that exist in 
OWASP ESAPI and how they affected the participants’ 
success in fixing the XSS vulnerability. 
From the results we identified 3 types of mistakes 
that programmers did, which are, 
 
1. Failing to identify all the places in the source code 
that contained XSS vulnerability. 
2. Using wrong encoding method to encode data. 
3. Using input encoding instead of output encoding. 
These mistakes resulted them in failing to fix the 
XSS vulnerability properly. Furthermore, we identified 
16 usability issues that exist in OWASP ESAPI. We 
observed that some of the usability issues we identified 
aided programmers into make mistakes that failed them 
in their task. Based on the results we proposed some 
improvements to OWASP ESAPI, which would enhance 
its usability and hence, would help programmers to 
more effectively and efficiently use it to fix XSS 
vulnerabilities. 
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A. Sample page from the application 
given to participants 
<td width="25%"> <h3>Delete</h3></td> 
</tr> 
<%for(int   i=0;i<posts.length;i++){%> 
<tr> 
 
<td    title="<%=posts[i].getSubject()    + 
"_subject"%>"><%=posts[i].getSubject()%> 
</td> 
 
<td    title="<%=posts[i].getSubject()    + 
"_author"%>"><%=posts[i].getAuthor()%> 
</td> 
 
<td   title="<%=posts[i].getSubject()   + 
"_content"%>"><a href=<%="article.jsp?id=" 
+  posts[i].getId()%>>View  Content</a>  </td> 
 
<td  title="<%=posts[i].getSubject()  +  "_author"%>" 
align="center"><button  type="button" 
onclick="deletePost('<%=posts[i].getSubject()%>', 
'<%=posts[i].getId()%>')">Delete</button></td> 
</tr> 
<%}%> 
<%if (posts.length <= 0){%> 
<tr> 
<th colspan="4">No Posts Found</th> 
</tr> 
<%}%> 
</table> 
<br> 
<a  href="post.jsp"  class="button">Create  New  Post 
</a> 
</body> 
 
 
 
<body    style="background-color:azure;"> 
<h1 align="center">Welcome to Forum!</h1> 
<table align="center" width="95%" border="2"> 
<tr> 
<td width="25%"> <h3>Subject</h3></td> 
<td width="25%"> <h3>Author</h3></td> 
<td width="25%"> <h3>Content</h3></td> 
